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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

a.

Nature of the Case
This is a wrongful death case brought brought by the estate and heirs of Rosamond Mattox

against the Life Care Center in Lewiston, Idaho. This appeal comes after the District Court
dismissed the Complaint after granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendant. The District
Court struck the affidavits of the Plaintiffs' experts, holding that the af1idavits were insuf1icient to
establish that the experts had actual knowledge of the standard of care for a skilled nursing facility
in Lewiston, Idaho, in October, 2008.

b.

Proceedings Below
Rosamond Mattox died on November 1, 2008, after being taken to Tri-State Hospital in

Clarkston, Washington for injuries suffered in her ninth fall of2008 at Life Care Center in Lewiston,
Idaho. The complaint in this matter was filed in the Nez Perce County District Court on October 22,
2010. The Defendants answered, with a general denial, on AprilS, 2011.
On May 21, 2012, Defendants moved for summary judgment, Plaintiffs responded and
moved to Enlarge Time. After hearing arguments on June 19,2012, the Court granted Plaintiffs'
Motion to Enlarge.
Defendants, on October 15,2012, filed a supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment, and
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Plaintiffs'responded. The hearing was held on November 13,2012. After hearing argument and
considering the pleadings, the Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order which granted
summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. This appeal followed.

c.

Statement of Facts

Rosamond Mattox died on November 1, 2008, after being dropped or allowed to fall for the
ninth (9 th ) time in a ten month period while residing at the Life Care Center of Lewiston (hereinafter
LCL). (R, Vol. III, p. 497, L 8.) This ninth (9th) drop or fall resulted in the second broken hip in
four (4) months and added to the list of injuries and broken bones suffered in the fateful year of
2008. The falls came after LCL failed or refused to follow the established care plans and doctors
orders in violation of state and federal regulations. (R, Vol. III pp. 496 - 509.)
Dr. Jayme Mackay, the primary care physician for Ms. Mattox, summarized as follows:
It is my professional opinion that Rosamond Mattox died as a result of an unbroken
and reasonably anticipated chain of events that arose as result of Life Care Center of
Lewiston failing to provide and use the cautions which had been ordered (either by
me or by the Care Plan). The failure to use those cautions was a breach of the
standard of care that was owed by Life Care Center of Lewiston to Rosamond Mattox
and that breach led to a series of falls that occurred in 2008 and culminated with a
fractured hip/femur. That fractured hip/femur was the cause of her death, as will be
elaborated upon below.
(R, Vol. III, p 484.)
In summarizing the treatment of Mrs. Mattox, Nurse Thomason opined:
49)

It is my opinion that the performance of the nursing staff of Life Care Center
of Lewiston was an extreme deviation from the standard of care and nursing
-2-

home practice standards for the Lewiston region in the state of Idaho for
2008, and that they fell significantly below State and Federal Guidelines
when they failed to follow physicians orders, their own plan of care acted in
an extremely careless and haphazard manner with an apparent disregard of
consequences in the provision of care for Rosamond Mattox as evidenced by:
a)
86% non-compliance with scheduled check and change
program as care planned for the months of July 2008 through
October 2008.
b)
74% non-compliance with the use of bed, side rails for the
months of July 2008 through October 2008.
c)
86% non-compliance with the use of the bed in the lowest
position as was care planned for the months of July 2008
through October 2008.
d)
99.3% non-compliance with the use of hip protectors as was
care plan for the months of July 2008 through October 2008.
e)

50)

51)

The lack of documentation to include nursing and caregiver
compliance with the consistent use of crash mats for Ms.
Mattox
f)
The lack of scheduled toileting intervention on the care plan
for incontinent resident with a history of falls; cognitive
impairment; moderately impaired decision-making; periods
of altered perception; mental function of varied over the
course of the day; typically unable to understand simple and
direct instructions; repetitive anxious concerns and repetitive
anxious physical movements.
g)
The lack of documentation to indicate the provision of2 person extensive to
total assistance with bed mobility, transfers, walking, dressing and toilet use,
as was identified as a need in the nursing home assessment and recommended
by the physician, Dr. Mackay.
Federal Regulation 483.13(c) defines "neglect" as a failure to provide goods
and services necessary to avoid physical harm, mental anguish or mental
illness. (42 CFR 488.301) Statutory requirements of the facility old way
accountable for the residents care and safety, including clinical decisions.
It is my professional opinion, within a reasonable degree of nursing
probability, based on the review of the records of the provided, my
experience, education and training, Life Care Center of Lewiston nursing
staff demonstrated a pattern of neglect and failure to exercise the standard of
-3-

care that reasonably prudent nursing staff would have exercised in a similar
situation. In doing so it was an extreme deviation from the nursing standards
and from accepted practice. These extreme deviations from the standard of
care resulted in falls for Ms. Mattox and the doctors have concluded those
falls proximally caused injury, suffering, and an untimely death for
Rosamond Mattox. Had LCL staff adhered to the doctor's orders and care
plan Ms. Mattox would not have suffered this final fractured hip.
R, Vol. III, pp 509 - 510.
In support oftheir motion for summary judgment, LCL relied on a nine (9) sentence affidavit
of Carol McIver, in which she asserts that she is the Director of Nursing for the Defendant, she is
a Registered Nurse, she knows the standard of care, she reviewed the LCL records and then she
concludes as follows:
Based on my actual knowledge of the applicable standard of health care practice, as
it applies to the care provided by Life Care Center of Lewiston, it is my opinion,
which opinion I hold to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the care and
treatment provided to Rosamond Mattox by the staff at Life Care Center of Lewiston
complied in all respects with the applicable standard of health care practice.
R, Vol. I, pp. 41 - 42.

Plaintiffs presented Affidavits from Dr. Jayme Mackay, and Nurse Wendy Thomason. Dr.
Mackay was the treating physician for Mrs. Mattox and based his opinions on his training and
experience, including his experience as the treating physician for Mrs. Mattox and other residents
of skilled nursing facilities during this the relevant time. Wendy Thomason is a registered nurse with
substantial qualifications, she familiarized herself with the local standard of care for skilled nursing
facilities in the Lewiston region in 2008 by interviewing four local medical professionals:
-4-

1)

Dr. Jayme Mackay, who was the primary care physician Mrs. Mattox and for a

number of residents of area nursing facilities, he interacted with nursing staffs providing care to his
patients, and had personal knowledge of the standard of care for nurses in nursing homes in the
Lewiston region in 2008 (Vol. III, pp 417.);
2)

Dr. Jane Fore, a physician in the Lewiston region who provides direct care to a

number of nursing home residents and who had actual knowledge of the standard of care for nurses
in nursing homes in the Lewiston region in 2008 ( R, Vol. III, p. 417).
3)

Debbie Lemon, who holds a masters degree in Nursing with the focus on Elderly

nursing/education; she is Associate Professor of Nursing, BSN program at Lewis-Clark State College
in Lewiston; Nurse Consultant for an adult family home; she was a clinical nursing instructor for
Walla Walla Community College (in Clarkston, Washington, and in the Lewiston region) teaching
long term care from 2002 - 2004; is a former Nurse Consultant for Guardian Angel Assisted Living
Homes; and is the former Administrator of Tri-State Health and Rehabilitation Center in Clarkston
Washington.

Tri-State Health and Rehabilitation Center is a 104-bed nursing home with

Medicare/Medicaid certification and an Alzheimers' Unit. (R, Vol. III, p. 495). During the time
of the events that gave rise to this suit, Ms. Lemon was teaching "Res-Care Home Care:
Assessments/Care plans and caregiver training" and "Practical Nursing" at Lewis-Clark State
College as an Associate Professor in the BSN program, she maintained her position as the Nurse
Consultant for Sycamore Glen, and she had just completed a three-year stint as an Associate
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Professor for Practical Nursing which included clinical rotation for geriatric care. (R, Vol. III, p.
516.)
4)

Kelli Stellmon, a registered nurse working with elderly patients and who had done

her own survey of nurses working in nursing homes in order to determine the local standard of care.
( R, Vol. III, p. 496.)
In addition to speaking to these four professionals, Nurse Thomason familiarized herself with
the standard of care by 1) knowing and reviewing both the federal and state regulations that apply
to the administration of care in a nursing homes; and 2) reading the affidavit of Carol McIver,
reviewing the CMS ratings for LCL, reviewing the Idaho surveys of LCL, reviewing of state and
national awards received by LCL, and reviewing LCL's own publications of how they hold
themselves out to be and the standard they publish to the world. (R, Vol. III, p. 494-95; T, Vol 1
(November, 13,2012), p. 20 - 21.)
The Defendants moved to strike the Affidavits of Wendy Thomason and Dr. Jayme Mackay.
Defendants claimed "[t ]he affidavits lack the foundational requirements necessary to meet the burden
of proof on the initial negligence element of the Plaintiff s prima facia [sic] case." Then Defendant's
claim that Nurse Thomason did "not identifY the applicable local standard of health care practice for
Lewiston, Idaho in 2008, in a long-term care facility, for a patient such as Ms. Mattox. Further the
local professionals identified, fail to meet the foundation required by Idaho Code §§ 6-1012, 61013." (R, Vol. III, p. 564.)
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Plaintiffs argued that Dr. Mackay and Nurse Thomason were competent and their testimony
did meet the statutory requirements.
Further, Plaintiffs argued that Defendant's had failed to raise a genuine issue of fact, as
required by IRCP 56, and therefore, the Defendant's Motion for Summary should be denied, and
summary judgment should be entered for the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs stated:
Counsel has adequately set forth in her motion to strike the requirements
necessary for an expert to be able to opine and for that opinion to be properly before
the Court. Rather than belaboring that law the undersigned points to it as support for
the proposition that the Affidavit of Carol McIver is incompetent to establish any fact
or basis for a dispute. Its self-serving nature is not a basis to ignore its contents, but
its conclusory nature, wholly without substance and foundation, leaves it ineffective.
The Defendants' Answer is a general denial and offers no support for their motion;
they are left with a bare motion supported by a vague and conclusory affidavit. It
should be noted that Defense counsel also has an affidavit before the court with
several exhibits of what are claimed to be records relating to this case. Even ignoring
that counsel is an incompetent witness, as counsel sets forth in her own motions and
memoranda, this is an area that requires expert testimony and the mere presence of
records does not create an issue of fact for the court.
This leaves the Court in the uncommon position of having two credible
experts' affidavits establishing negligence on the part of the defendant, and nothing
in the record capable of raising a genuine issue to the contrary.

R, Vol. II, pp 410 - 411.

After the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court ruled that:
While it is evident that Ms. Thomason and her colleagues are well versed in the care
of elderly patients, this alone is not sufficient to meet the requirements ofLC. § 61012 and 1013. Nothing in Thomason's affidavits establishes that Ms. Thomason
became knowledgeable regarding the local standard of care by speaking with an
individual who was familiar with the local standard of skilled nursing facility care,
-7-

in Lewiston, Idaho, in October and November of2008. Ms. Thomason's inquiry of
physicians is inadequate for purposes of this case, unless those physicians can explain
why they have personal knowledge of the local standard of care for nurses in a skilled
care facility in Lewiston, Idaho, in October 2008. Ms. Thomason also referred to two
nurses; however, the record is silent regarding these individuals' personal experience
regarding the local standard of care for nurses in a skilled care facility in Lewiston,
Idaho, in October, 2008. Without this information, Ms. Thomason's affidavits are
not sufficient for purposes of the motions before the Court.
R, Vol. III, pp. 598-99.
The Court went on to state:
While Ms. Thomason did speak to nurses, the affidavits do not indicate these nurses
possessed sufficient knowledge of the local standard of care applicable to the
defendants in the same time frame of the alleged malpractice. Simply being a nurse
is not sufficient, there must be a connection to skilled nursing facility care, in
Lewiston, Idaho in October, 2008. Without this information, the Defendants' motion
to strike is granted. As a result, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is
also granted because no evidence has been provided which raises a question of
material fact regarding whether LCL was negligent in the care of Mrs. Mattox.
The Plaintiffs have also submitted the affidavits of Dr. Jayme Mackay in response
to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Dr. Mackay's affidavits provide
no information whatsoever regarding his knowledge of the local standard of care for
nurses in a skilled nursing facility in Lewiston, Idaho, in October, 2008. Thus, for
the same reasons as stated above, the Defendants' motion to strike the affidavits of
Dr. Mackay is also granted. Consequently, the Defendants' motion for summary
judgment is also granted because no evidence has been provided which raises a
question of material fact regarding whether LCL was negligent in the care of Mrs.
Mattox.
R, Vol. III, pp. 600 - 01.
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I)

Did the trial court err in ruling that Mattox had failed to lay adequate foundation for
the admission of the testimony of her nursing expert, Wendy C. Thomason, RN.?

2)

Did the trial court err in ruling that Mattox had failed to lay adequate foundation for
the admission of the testimony of her expert, Dr. Jayme Mackay?

3)

Did the trial court err in allowing the testimony of Carol McIver?

4)

Did the trial court err by granting summary judgment to Defendants?

5)

Did the trial court err by failing to grant summary judgment to Plaintiffs?

III. ARGUMENT
A. Guiding Principles

L

On a motion for summary judgment, the record is to be reviewed and liberally construed in
favor of the non-moving party with all doubts resolved against the moving party and all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
The Idaho courts have established standards that require the District Court, and reviewing

appellate courts, to:
to liberally construe the facts in the existing record in favor of the nonmoving party,
and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving
party. Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658,660,651 P.2d 923,925 (1982) .... "[A]ll
doubts are to be resolved against the moving party." Ashby v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67,
69,593 P.2d 402,404 (1979). The motion must be denied "if the evidence is such
that conflicting inferences can be drawn therefrom and ifreasonable [people] might
reach different conclusions." Id. [citation omitted.]

-9-

Pearson v Parsons, 114 Idaho 334, 338, 757 P.2d 197,201 (1988)
2.

The admissibility of expert testimony is separate from summary judgment issues and must
be determined separately.
The standard ofliberal construction and reasonable inferences does not apply to the District

Court's consideration of whether the submitted affidavits are admissible. Instead, the striking of
affidavits is an evidentiary ruling which is reviewed by this Court under the abuse of discretion
standard. Dulaney v. Sf. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 137 Idaho 160, 163-64,45 P.3d 816
(Idaho 2002). The District Court is to determine whether the affidavit alleges facts, which if taken
as true, would make the testimony ofthat witness admissible. Rhodehouse v Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,
211 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Idaho 1994).

3.

In order for expert testimony to be admissible, a proper foundation must be laid .
... expert testimony may only be admitted in evidence if the foundation therefor is
first laid, establishing (a) that such an opinion is actually held by the expert witness,
(b) that the said opinion can be testified to with reasonable medical certainty, and (c)
that such expert witness possesses professional knowledge and expertise coupled
with actual knowledge of the applicable said community standard to which his or her
expert opinion testimony is addressed; ....

I.C. §6-1013. The Rhodehouse court amplified on this statute by stating:
Added to these requirements in the summary judgment context is the additional
provision ofI.R.C.P. 56(e) that the affidavits must "set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein."
Rhodehouse, at 212,868 P.2d at 1228.
-10-

4.

The moving party has the first duty to produce admissible testimony for a summary judgment
motion, and may not rely on mere allegations and conclusory statements.
This principle is established both by rule and by caselaw. It is principally embodied in

I.R.C.P. 56(e), and has been confirmed by the Idaho courts. The rule states:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show atlirmatively that
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto
or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed
by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for
summary jUdgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the
party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party.
I.R.C.P.56(e).
As set forth in the rule, the affidavits must: 1) be made on personal knowledge; 2) set forth
admissible evidence, including competency ofthe affiant. In order for the evidence to be admissible,
it must be more than mere allegations and conclusory statements, and must meet the foundational
threshhold for admissibility.
The Supreme Court addressed this principle when in Pearson they stated:
Merely filing a motion for summary judgment is not sufficient to place the burden on
the adverse party to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact. The
motion must be supported as provided in I.R.C.P. 56 in order to invoke the
requirement that "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
-11-

must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." LR.C.P.
56( e).

Pearson, at 338,757 P.2d at 201. (See also: Johnson v McPhee, 147 Idaho 455,460,210 P.3d 563,

560 (2009), "When a summary judgment motion has been supported by depositions, affidavits or
other evidence, the adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of that party's
pleadings but by affidavits or as otherwise provided in the rule, must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial"; Hayward v Jacks, 141 Idaho 622, 115 P .3d 713 (Idaho 2005),
"To meet this burden, the moving party must" challenge in its motion and establish through evidence
the absence of any genuine issue of material fact on an element of the nonmoving party's case."
[citation omitted].)
The principle of insufficiency of conclusory affidavits is also well-established: "Statements
that are conclusory or speculative do not satisfy either the requirement of admissability or
competency under Rule 56(e)." (Dulaney, at 164,45 P.3d at 820, citing Kolln v Sf. Luke's Reg 'I
Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d 1142 (1997).) (See also: Corbridge v Clark Equipment Co., 112

Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986)( conclusory affidavit disregarded); Tapper Chevrolet Co.
v. Hansen, 95 Idaho 436, 439,510 P.2d 1091,1094 (1973)(affidavits in support or opposition to

summary judgment must set forth facts admissible into evidence); Rhodehouse, at 213,868 P.2d at
1229, "The trial court correctly reasoned that Jenkins' only showing of knowledge of the local
standard was his unsupported conclusory statement in his affidavit, and that this was an insufficient

-12-

foundation for admissibility"); Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 254 P.3 d 11, 151 Idaho 110 (Idaho 2011),
("The affiant must have personal knowledge of the facts contained within the affidavit and
statements within it cannot be conclusory or speculative. Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 164,45 P.3d at
820.").

~

Once the moving party has produced admissible testimony, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce sufficient admissible evidence to raise a genuine issue of material
fact.

The Pearson Court clearly set forth this principle:
Merely fIling a motion for summary judgment is not sufficient to place the burden on
the adverse party to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact. The
motion must be supported as provided in I.R.C.P. 56 in order to invoke the
requirement that "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P.
56(e).

Pearson, at 338, 757 P.2d at 201. (See also: Litz v. Robinson, 131 Idaho 282, 955 P.2d 113 (Idaho
App. 1997), "Therefore, when the doctors submitted affidavits sufficient to support their motions
for summary judgment, which Litz has not challenged in this appeal, the burden was shifted to Litz
to support his claim with direct expert testimony that satisfied the requirements ofI.C. §§ 6-1012
and 6-1013.")
The rule sets out this requirement with clarity:
... When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's
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pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. ...

LR.C.P. 56(e) (emphasis added.)
6.

Once admissible testimony is before the Court, the summary judgment standards apply.
"It is axiomatic that on summary judgment, the Court views all facts and inferences
from the record in favor of the nonmoving party and the moving party has the burden
of proving the absence of genuine issues of material fact. [citation omitted.]".

Rhodehouse v Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 210, 868 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Idaho 1994)

As will be demonstrated below, the District Court improperly struck the affidavits of
Plaintiffs's experts and erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Further, the
Defendants did not meet the requirements ofLR.C.P. 56 as the Defendants' supporting affidavit was
insufficient.

B. Striking of Affidavits

L

The District Court Erred in Striking the Affidavits of Wendy C. Thomason and Dr. Jayme
Mackay.
In the instant case, the trial court abused its discretion by striking the affidavits of Wendy C.

Thomason, RN., and Dr. Jayme Mackay. Both witnesses were sufficiently qualified, and the record
was sufficiently complete for the statements to be admitted.
The District Court noted that
The question of how to qualifY an out-of-area expert to render an opinion in a
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medical malpractice case has been described as a question that "has plagued the
bench and trial bar since the enactment of Idaho's statutory structure ... requiring
proof [of] actual knowledge of the local standard of care. Keyser v Garner, 129
Idaho 112, 117,933 P.2d 409 (Ct. App. 1996). A common way for an out-of-area
expert to become familiar with the local standard of care is to inquire of a local
specialist. Perry, 134 Idaho 46,51,995 P.2d 816 (2000).

R, Vol. III, p. 597.
The Court then quotes from Keyser setting forth the foundational standard for an out -of-area expert:
The foregoing cases all indicate the foundational prerequisite of familiarity with the
community standard of care is satisfied by an out-of area physician's testimony that
he or she has conversed about those standards with a qualified physician practicing
in the community and has thereby become knowledgeable about the local standards.
[citations omitted.] R, Vol. III, p. 597.
In 2002, the Supreme Court evaluated a number of its prior cases regarding out-of-state
experts and qualifying them to know the local standard. The Court summarized those cases as
follows:
This Court has examined a number of cases where a defendant moved for summary
judgment based on the allegation that the plaintiffs out-of-state expert insufficiently
familiarized himself with the local standard of care. Although these cases do not
provide a clear-cut set of rules on what an out-of-state expert must do to become
familiar with the local standard of care, these cases demonstrate that this Court
has been willing to affirm a district court's grant of summary judgment on this
basis when the plaintiffs expert failed to contact any local physician. Likewise,
this Court has been reluctant to grant a defendant's motion for summary
judgment when the plaintiffs expert did consult a local physician possessing
expertise on the area at issue. Dekker v. Magic Valley Reg'/ Med. etr., 115 Idaho
332,334, 766 P.2d 1213, 1215 (1988)(affirming grant of summary judgment when
out-of-state experts did nothing to establish familiarity with the local standard of
care); Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d 165,168 (1997) (affirming
grant of summary judgment because plaintiffs expert, an ophthalmologist, was a
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physician, and thus the standard of care he was familiar with differed significantly
from that of the defendant, an optometrist, who was not a physician); Hoene v.
Barnes, 121 Idaho 752, 828 P.2d 315 (1992) (vacating grant of summary judgment
because in cases involving a physician practicing in a unique specialty, such as
cardiovascular surgery, plaintiffs expert may be unable to familiarize himself with
the local standard by conversing with a local physician and no "similar Idaho
communities" may exist, thus necessitating testimony from an out-of-state
physician); Dunlap By and Through Dunlap v. Garner, 127 Idaho 599, 903 P.2d
1296 (1994) (reversing summary judgment because the trial court's job was to look
to the affidavit itself and determine whether the alleged facts, if taken as true, would
render the evidence admissible, not to weigh conflicting evidence as to the
truthfulness of the expert's affidavit); Rhodehouse, 125 Idaho at 212-13,868 P.2d at
1228-29 (affirming summary judgment because expert's only showing of knowledge
ofthe local standard was his unsupported conclusory statement--he did not contact
any local physician and the local standard of care was not discussed in the deposition
that he reviewed); Watts v. Lynn, 125 Idaho 341, 347,870 P.2d 1300,1306 (1994)
(reversing grant of summary jUdgment because expert familiarized himself with local
standards by conferring with a local dentist); Strode v. Lenzi, 116 Idaho 214, 216,
77 5 P .2d 106, 108 (1989) (affirming summary judgment where nationally certified
expert claimed that his familiarity with standards set by American Academy of
Orthopedic Surgeons was sufficient to familiarize himselfwith local standards); and
Frank v. East Shoshone Hosp., 114 Idaho 480, 482,757 P.2d 1199, 1201 (1988)
(affirming summary judgment where expert failed to contact any local physicians and
was thus unfamiliar with the local standard).

Grover v Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105 (2002) (emphasis added).
A review of cases since 2002, reveals that the Court has not changed course from that stated
in Grover. In 2003 the Court heard Shane v Blair, 139 Idaho 126, 75 P.3d 180 (2003), in which the
expert was from out-of-area, but as a doctor at the University of Utah his experience included taking
numerous referrals from the area and reviewing hundreds of medical records from doctors in the
area, which established his familiarity with the local standard at the relevant time. In 2007, the Court
addressed McDaniel v Inland Northwest Renal Care Group-Idaho LLC, 144 Idaho 219, 159 P.3d
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856 (2007) in which the out-of-area expert was excluded after testifYing that there was only a
national standard and having failed to contact any local physician to determine whether the local
standard varied from the national standard.
In 2011, the Court addressed two cases: Hoover v Hunter, 150 Idaho 658, 249 P.3d 851
(2011), in which the Plaintiff attempted to be his own expert but was properly excluded when the
court determined that an EMT was incompetent to testifY to the standard of a gastroenterologist in
a medical emergency situation. The other case was Suhadolnikv Pressman, 151 Idaho 110,254 P .3d
11 (2011) in which the out-of-area expert did not contact any local professional and attempted to rely
solely on the deposition of the defendant and failed to establish the applicability of any national
standard, and was therefore excluded.
In 2012 the Court issued the opinion in Arregui v Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 291 P.3d
1000 (2012), in which the expert's affidavit was untimely and therefore excluded. The District Court
then relied on the expert's deposition, in which testified she had never been to Idaho and had never
spoken with an Idaho physician.
Finally, earlier this year, the Court issued the opinion in Hall v Rocky Mountain Emergency

Physicians, LLC, 090613 IDSCCI 39473 (2013), wherein the expert was excluded even though he
had contacted two physicians; however, neither were named and there was nothing in the record that
showed how the expert became aware of the local standard at the relevant time.
One pithy wording of the standard came from Justice Huntley in a concurring opinion in
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Frank v East Shoshone Hospital, when he wrote: "it does not take a Herculean effort for an expert
to become familiar with the local standard of care. It can be done on the telephone." 114 Idaho 480,
484, 757 P.2d 1199, 1203 (1988).

a.

Nurse Wendy C. Thomason Is a Qualified Expert Who's Testimony Should Have Been
Considered by the District Court.
In the instant case, Nurse Thomason set forth her extensive experience in the nursing

profession, in particular to her experience with skilled nursing facilities. She also set forth:
I have worked as an expert witness in numerous cases around America. I am fully
acquainted with the federal laws and regulations governing skilled nursing facilities
and am acquainted with the applicable standard of care on the national level, as well
as in various regions across the nation. I have provided expert witness services on
cases in Idaho. I am also familiar with the Idaho laws and regulations governing
skilled nursing facilities.
R, Vol. III, p. 494.
Nurse Wendy Thomason was familiar with the national standard, the state standard, and
became familiar with the local standard at the relevant time by reading the affidavit of Carol McIver
(which was conclusory, as will be address infra, and therefore unhelpful), reviewed the Center for
Medicaid Services' (and other organizations') ratings and reviews for nursing homes in Lewiston
in 2008 (R, Vol. III, p. 495; T, Vol. I (November 13,2012), p. 21), reviewed the Idaho surveys
(investigations of nursing homes) (T, Vol. I (Nov. 13,2012), p. 21-22), and LCL's publications and
state and national awards (R, Vol. III, p. 495), and 6000+ pages ofLCL' s records (R, Vol. II, p. 203),
and then she interviewed four named local professionals: two doctors (Dr. Jane Fore and Dr. Jayme
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Mackay) and two nurses (Kelli Stellmon and Debbie Lemon) who knew the local standard. R, Vol.
III, p. 495 -496; T, Vol. I (Nov. 13,2012), p. 22.
Nurse Thomason was required to show that she a) familiar with the standard of care for that
type of health care professional in the relevant community and time; and b) how she became familiar
with that standard of care. Dulaney, at 164,45 P.3e at 820. There are various methods by which an
expert may become familiar with the specific standard of care; one of which is by inquiring of a local
specialist (Id.), and Idaho courts have recognized that, for nursing homes and some other areas of
health care, "governmental regulation, both at the state and federal level, has resulted in the
establishment of minimum standards for dispensation of care". These two areas will be addressed
separately.
Nurse Thomason interviewed four local professionals as part of her efforts to ensure
familiarization with the local standard of care: Dr. Jane Fore, Dr. Jayme Mackay, Nurse Debbie
Lemon, and Nurse Kelli Stellmon. R, Vol. III, pp. 495-96. Each of the four knew the standard of
care for nurses in a nursing home in 2008, and each had a different basis for that knowledge.
Dr. Fore is a physician who provides direct care to nursing home residents; she has worked
with nurses in the region's nursing homes for several years and "has actual knowledge of the
standard of care for nurses in a nursing home in the Lewiston region in 2008." R, Vol. III, p. 495.
Dr. Jayme Mackay was the primary care physician for Rosamond Mattox until her death. He
was involved in approximately 30 nursing exchanges with LeL regarding Ms. Mattox in 2008,
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which was more than for any of his other patients who were in nursing homes. He directed that
specific orders be followed and was aware of additional orders as part of the Care Plan. R. Vol. III,
p. 484. He was also the primary care physician for a number of nursing home residents, and had been
for many years. R, Vol. III, p. 496. He reviewed his medical records, records from Tri-State
Hospital and LCL. He is sufficiently aware of the standard of care for nurses in a skilled nursing
facility to offer his opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty (R, Vol. III, p. 483) that LCL
breached that standard (R, Vol. III, p. 484.)
Dr. Mackay "is personally aware of the standard of care for nurses in nursing homes in the
Lewiston region in 2008." R, Vol. III, p. 496.
Nurse Kelli Stellmon is a registered nurse with over 20 years experience. She received her
AAS from Eastern Idaho Vo-Tech in Idaho Falls in 1979, and received her AD in Nursing from
Walla Walla Community College in Clarkston, Washington in 2008. In 2008, she was working as
a Med/Surg nurse for Tri-State Hospital in Clarkston. Beginning in 2009 through 2011 she worked
for Tri-State Home Health and Hospice. In2011 she began working in the Tri-State Wound Healing
Center where most of her patients were elderly, diabetic, obese and/or have kidney disease. R, Vol.

III, p. 526. She became familiar with the appropriate standard of care in this case by surveying
nurses working in nursing homes in the Lewiston region. R, Vol. III, p. 496.
Debbie Lemon has years of experience as a Director of Nursing and Administrator for a
nursing homes in the Lewiston area, as a nurse consultant and as a professor of nursing and was
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teaching the standard of care for skilled nursing providers to nursing students in the local nursing
school in 2008. Nurse Lemon is a registered nurse with a Masters Degree in nursing with a focus
on Elderly nursing/education. She is (and in 2008 was) an Associate Professor of Nursing, in the
BSN program at Lewis-Clark State College teaching Assessments/Care plans and caregiver training.
R, Vol. III, p. 495, 516. From the year 2000 until present she was the Nurse Consultant at Sycamore
Glen (Adult Family Home). From 2004 - 2007 she was an Assistant Professor in the Practical
Nursing Program at Lewis-Clark State College in Lewiston and taught the geriatric clinical rotation.
Other relevant experience included time as the Nurse Consultant for Guardian Angel Assisted Living
Homes and two years as the Administrator ofTri-State Health and Rehabilitation Center (a 104 bed
nursing home in Clarkston, Washington), two years as Director of Nursing at Tri-State Health and
Rehabilitation, and eight years as Administrator/Director of Nursing of Valley Rehabilitation and
Living Center (now Orchards Nursing Center). Workshops and Conventions she attended included:
Geriatric Nurse Educators Consortium (October, 2008), Teaching Geriatric Content (August, 2009).
She is involved with the Alzheimer's Support Group and has provided assistance to Adult Family
Homes by providing nurse delegation to staff, resident physical assessment, care plans, and
administrative consultation from 2005 to present (again, working with the local standard of care).
R, Vol. III, pp. 495, 516-23.
After taking the foregoing steps to familiarize herself with the standard of care, Nurse
Thomason offered the opinion that:
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the standard of care for skilled nursing facilities in the Lewiston region during this
time period was (as it generally remains) very similar to the standard of care for
skilled nursing facilities nationwide. This is due, in large part, to the substantial
regulation of this industry by the federal government. My opinions stated herein are
addressed to this local standard of care as it existed in 2008. My opinions stated
herein are opinions that I actually hold and are made to a reasonable nursing
certainty.
R, Vol. III, p. 495.
With her background of understanding of the national standard and the state standard, and
the research done, once Ms. Thomason was able to speak with the four local professionals she was
familiar with the standard of care and able to offer her opinion thereon. Similar to the expert in
Pearson, Nurse Thomason was able to demonstrate the requisite knowledge:

1)

Nurse Thomason demonstrated that she was judging LCL "in comparison with similarly
trained and qualified professionals in the same community, taking into account his or her
training experience, and fields of medical specialization." I.C. § 6-1012. ("It is my opinion
that the performance of the nursing staff of Life Care Center of Lewiston was an extreme
deviation from the standard of care and nursing home practice standards for the Lewiston
region in the state ofIdaho for 2008 ... " R, Vol. III, p. 429.)

2)

She is a "knowledgeable and competent expert witness." I.C. §6-1 0 13. ("I am a registered
nurse, and have been since 1989 .... In that position I provide direct nursing care to
adolescent through geriatric residents in a skilled nursing facility .... " R, Vol. III, p. 414-15;
"it is evident that Ms. Thomason and her colleagues are well versed in the care of elderly
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patients ... " R, Vol. III, p. 598.)
3)

She actually holds an opinion about the applicable standard of care and the failure ofLCL
staff to meet the standard. I.C. §6-1013(a). ("My opinions state herein are opinions that I
actually hold and are made to a reasonable nursing certainty." R, Vol. III, p. 418; "It is my
professional opinion, within a reasonable degree of nursing probability, ... that LCL nursing
staff demonstrated a pattern of neglect and failure to exercise the standard of care ... " R, Vol.
III, p. 418; "It is my opinion that the performance of the nursing staff of Life Care Center of
Lewiston was an extreme deviation from the standard of care .... " R, Vol. III, p. 428.)

4)

Her opinion was rendered with "reasonable medical certainty." I.C. §6-1 013(b). ("It is my
professional opinion, within a reasonable degree of nursing probability, .... " R, Vol. III, p.
418.)

5)

She possessed "professional knowledge and expertise coupled with actual knowledge of the
applicable ... community standards to which her ... expert opinion is addressed." I.C. §610 13(c). ("I have familiarized myself with the standard of care for skilled nursing facilities
in the Lewiston region in 2008 and have become acquainted therewith and therefore I have
knowledge of that standard of care." R, Vol. III, p. 415-516.)
Beyond all the foregoing, Ms. Thomason further addressed the breach of the state and federal

standards that have been set for care in a nursing facility. As state above, Ms. Thomason noted that
she is "fully acquainted with the federal laws and regulations governing skilled nursing facilities .. .1
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am also familiar with the Idaho laws and regulations governing skilled nursing facilities." R, Vol.
III,p.415.
The fact that there are national standards for nursing homes and that those standards are
applicable in Idaho is not a novel concept. Indeed, Idaho cases have already acknowledged such
a principle. In the case of McDaniel v Inland Northwest Renal Care Group of Idaho, LLC, 144
Idaho 219,159 P.3d 856 (2007), the Court acknowledged that
Recent years have witnessed increasing standardization in the health care profession,
due to a variety of factors. Governmental regulation, both at the state and federal
level, has resulted in the establishment of minimum standards for dispensation of
care in specific areas, such as certain care standards applicable in the nursing home
setting under HHS regulations, Hayward, and the adoption of certain national dental
care standards in the State Dental Practice Act, Grover v. Smith, 137 Idaho 247,250,
46 P.3d 1105, 1108 (2002).

McDaniel, at 224, 159 P.3d at 86l.
The McDaniel court explained that not every regulatory scheme promulgated by the federal
government establishes a standard of care; there are significant differences between regulations that
govern the physical administration of health, and otherwise. It is only where the regulation concerns
the administration of health services that they establish a standard which will be recognized.

(McDaniel at 223,159 P.3d at 860; see also: Haywardv. Jack's Pharmacy Inc., 115 P.3d 713,141
Idaho 622 (2005).)
In the instant case, the Idaho courts have already acknowledged that the HHS regulations
have established certain care standards. Ms. Thomason also specifically avers that there is a national
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standard that is implicated and relates it to the local standard: "the standard for skilled nursing
facilities in the Lewiston region during this time period was (as it generally remains) very similar
to the standard of care for skilled nursing facilities nationwide. This is due, in large part, to the
substantial regulation fo this industry by the federal government." R, Vol. III, p. 496.
In her affidavit, Ms. Thomason also shows the applicability of state and federal regulations:
State and federal regulations require skilled nursing facilities to observe and evaluate
the condition of each patient or resident and develop a written individualized patient
care plan which is to be based upon assessment of the needs of each patient or
resident which must be kept current. Care plans are to include measurable objectives
and timetables to meet the residents needs must describe services that are to be
furnished to attain or maintain the residence highest practicable physical, mental, and
psychosocial well-being as required under the federal regulations. State regulations
require the development of the written care plan upon admission of a resident, and
that the care plan is to be developed from a nursing assessment of the patient's needs,
strengths and weaknesses; developed in coordination with other patient care services
provided to the patient; written to include care to be given, goals to be accomplished,
actions necessary to attain the goals. The care plan is to be reviewed and revised as
needed to reflect the current needs of the patient and the current goals to be
accomplished. It is to be available for use by all personnel caring for the patient.
The patient's needs are to be recognized by nursing staff and nursing services are to
be provided to assure that each patient receives care necessary to meet their total
needs. Idaho nursing services rule requires changing position every two hours when
confined to a bed or wheelchair and an opportunity for exercise to promote
circulation and protection from accident or injury. Federal regulations require the
facility ensure that each resident receives adequate supervision and assistance devices
to prevent accidents. Attached hereto as Exhibit E is are [sic] true and correct copies
of selected Federal and State statutes referenced in the foregoing. They are included
by this reference as though set forth at length.
R, Vol. III, p. 505 - 06.
Ms. Thomason then covers some of the many ways in which LCL violated the regulations

-25-

referenced above and included in the Exhibit. Examples include:
in 2008, Ms. Mattox fell or was dropped nine (9) times in a 10 month period (the
ninth fall was terminal) (R, Vol. III, p. 418, 424 - 25). These instances occurred despite both
doctor's orders and care plans that required protective devices and additional supervision/assistance;
the protective devices and additional supervision/assistance were routinely not used in violation of
the orders, plans, and regulations (specifically: for the month of October 2008, Ms. Mattox was
provided with siderails on her bed just 27 of 91 shifts and they were not in use at the time of the fatal
fall; the bed was ordered to be in the low position to avoid or mitigate injuries should Ms. Mattox
fall out, but in October 2008, the low bed was only used 9 out of91 shifts; two (2) staff members
were to assist Ms. Mattox in transferring out of or into bed or wheelchair to help prevent falls, but
there was no documented use of two person transfer; etc.) (R, Vol. III, pp. 424 - 25);
despite regulations that require that a resident change position every two hours when
confined to a bed or wheelchair, in the final month of her life (October, 2008) Ms. Mattox only
received check and change services 11 out of 91 shifts (R, Vol. III, p. 424);
hip protectors had been ordered for Ms. Mattox to wear to mitigate against any
injuries should she fall, but in her last months (July to October), during which time she fell and twice
broke her hip, the protection was only used two (2) times. R, Vol. III, p. 425.
The list of violations is extensive; the result was the death of Ms. Mattox. The violations are
summarized on pages 16 -17 of Ms. Thomason's Amended Second Affidavit (R, Vol. III, pp 508 -
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09).
The regulations cited to by Ms. Thomason are regulations for the administration of care; as
such they are recognized as establishing a national standard of care, a standard LCL violated as set
forth by Ms. Thomason.
For the foregoing reasons, it was error for the Court to strike Ms. Thomason's affidavit. This
Court should reverse the District Court and remand with instructions.

b.

Dr. Jayme Mackay Is a Qualified Expert Who's Affidavit Is Sufficient and Should Not Have
Been Struck.
The District Court stated:
... Dr. Mackay's affidavits provide no information whatsoever regarding his
knowledge of the local standard of care for nurses in a skilled nursing facility in
Lewiston, Idaho in October, 2008.

R, Vol. III, p. 600 - 01.
However, such a finding is inconsistent with the record before the Court.
First, the principle that expert witnesses are not to required to be of the same specialty as the
defendant is well established. See: Pearson v Parsons, at 337, 757 P.2d at 200; Suhodolnik, 151
Idaho at 116,254 P.3d at 17.
Second, Dr. Mackay's position in this case is similar to, though distinguishably stronger than
the position ofthe expert in Newberry v Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 127 P.3d 187 (2005). InNewberry
the expert was an opthalmologist whereas the defendant was a family practice physician. The court
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noted: "Dr. Martens correctly concedes that it is unnecessary for an expert witness to be ofthe same
specialty as the defendant so long as the expert establishes he possesses actual knowledge of the
standard of care to be applied. [citation omitted.]" Newberry, at 292, 127 P.3d at 195. However, the
expert never explici tly asked a family practice physician what the standard of care in Twin Falls was.
The expert testified "that he learned the standard of care by practicing alongside family physicians
in Twin Falls, by providing and obtaining referrals, and by discussing patient care with them." Id.
The admission of the expert testimony was upheld.
In the instant case, Dr. Mackay "never explicitly asked a [nurse] what the standard of care
in Lewiston was." Rather he "learned the standard of care by practicing alongside [nurses] in
[Lewiston nursing homes] ... and by discussing patient care with them." This is demonstrated
through the affidavits before the Court.
Dr. Mackay was Rosamond Mattox' primary care physician. R, Vol. III, p. 484.
He worked with the nurses to provide care for Ms. Mattox. ("I had approximately 30 nursing
exchanges with LCL regarding Ms. Mattox" in 2008. R, Vol, III, p. 484.)
He worked with nurses to provide care for other of his patients during this same time frame.
("I cannot think of any other patient I have had that has required so much interaction with the nursing
staff at the nursing home." R, Vol. III, p. 484; he "is the primary physician for a number of nursing
home residents, and had done so for years." R, Vol. III, p. 417.)
He discussed patient care with the nurses. ("I was made aware of a number of meetings with
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nurses and administrators that were called because Gene or Sandra were concerned about whether
the care being provided was the right care." R, Vol. III, p. 485. "I requested specific order be carried
out for the safety and well-being of Ms. Mattox .... " R. Vol. III, p. 484.)
He knew the standard of care. ("He is personally aware of the standard of care for nurses in
nursing homes in the Lewiston region in 2008." R. Vol. III, p. 417.)
The notable distinction between the Newberry expert and Dr. Mackay is that Dr. Mackay was
personally involved in providing care for this person, in the defendant's facility, at the time of

the alleged malpractice. He has both first-hand, and expert knowledge of the events.
Like the expert in Newberry, his basis for knowing the applicable standard of care comes
from direct relationship and working with the profession in question. Unlike the expert in Newberry,
Dr. Mackay had an unfortunate front-row seat to observe and learn the standard and see the breach;
a breach about which he testified ("to a reasonable degree of medical certainty" (R, Vol. III, p. 483)):
It is my professional opinion that Rosamond Mattox died as a result of an unbroken
and reasonably anticipated chain of events that arose as a result of Life Care Center
of Lewiston failing to provide and use the cautions which had been ordered (either
by me or the Care Plan). The failure to use those cautions was a breach of the
standard of care that was owed by Life Care Center of Lewiston to Rosamond Mattox

R, Vol. III, p. 484.
The record is substantial and sufficient; and Dr. Mackay's affidavit should not have been
struck. This court should reverse the District Court and remand with instructions.
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2.

The Affidavit of Carol McIver is ineffective to support the Defendant's motion.
The Defendants moved for summary judgment pursuant to I.R.C. P. 56. The bringing of the

motion places a burden on them to come forward with admissible facts to support their claim that
there is no genuine issue of material fact.
The Defendants brought forth a solitary, nine-sentence affidavit to meet this burden.
Ms. McIver's affidavit, with its attached curriculum vitae, is sufficient to establish facts to
support that she knew the "standard of care practice applicable to the care and treatment of
Rosamond Mattox in October 2008 for a facility such as Life Care Center of Lewiston in Lewiston,
Idaho." R, Vol. I, p. 41.
I.R.C.P. 56( e) requires that an affiant have personal knowledge of the facts contained within
an affidavit, and that the statements contained within such an expert affidavit cannot be conclusory
statements of fact.
For those who are to be experts, like Ms. McIver, there are foundational requirements that
must be met prior the to consideration of their affidavit. These foundational requirements have been
discussed exhaustively supra and will not be further covered here, except to note that Ms. McIver's
affidavit is ineffective in meeting those requirements.
Beyond the foundational requirements, I.R.C.P. 56(e) requires that affidavits submitted on
a motion for summary judgment must "set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Suhodolnik
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v Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 116,254 P.3d 11, 17 (2011); I.R.C.P. 56 (e). "The affiant must have
personal knowledge of the facts contained within the affidavit and statements within it cannot be

conclusory or speculative." Id. (Citing Dulaney at 164, 820) (Emphasis added.)
Again, due to the self-serving and conclusory nature ofthe affidavit, Ms. McIver's affidavit
is ineffective at meeting the necessary threshhold.
As stated above, the Defendants rely entirely upon the solitary affidavit from Ms. McIver,
containing a total of nine (9) sentences. Her entire testimony to establish her basis of knowledge of
care and her opinion there on is as follows:
I am familiar and have actual knowledge ofthe care provided by Life Care Center of
Lewiston as it pertains to Rosamond Mattox. I have also researched her care and
medical records from Life care Center of Lewiston, to include the time in question.
It is my opinion that Life Care Center of Lewiston provided proper supervision, was
staffed appropriately, and did provide the proper care required for Rosamond Mattox.
Based on my actual knowledge of the applicable standard of health care practice, as
it applies to the care provided by Life Care Center of Lewiston, it is my opinion,
which opinion I hold to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the care and
treatment provided to Rosamond Mattox by the staff at Life Care Center of Lewiston
complied in all respects with the applicable standard of health care practice.

R, Vol. I, pp. 41 - 42.
As argued to the District Court:
Counsel has adequately set forth in her motion to strike the requirements necessary
for an expert to be able to opine and for that opinion to be properly before the Court.
Rather than belaboring that law the undersigned points to it as support for the
proposition that the Affidavit of Carol McIver is incompetent to establish any fact or
basis for a dispute. Its self-serving nature is not a basis to ignore its contents, but its
conclusory nature, wholly without substance and foundation, leaves it ineffective.
The Defendants' Answer is a general denial and offers no support for their
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motion; they are left with a bare motion supported by a vague and conclusory
affidavit. It should be noted that Defense counsel also has an affidavit before the
court with several exhibits of what are claimed to be records relating to this case.
Even ignoring that counsel is an incompetent witness, as counsel sets forth in her
own motions and memoranda, this is an area that requires expert testimony and the
mere presence of records does not create an issue of fact for the court.
R, Vol. II, p. 41 0 (emphasis added).
As the Court stated in Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 254 P .3d 11 (Idaho 2011):
"The affiant must have personal knowledge of the facts contained within the affidavit and statements
within it cannot be conclusory or speculative. Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 164,45 P.3d at 820."
It is true that the McIver affidavit, with its attached Vitae, is sufficient to establish her

personal knowledge; however, everything else remains conclusory. As the Dulaney Court reiterated:
"Statements that are conclusory or speculative do not satisfY either the requirement of admissibility
or competency under Rule 56(e)." (Dulaney, at 164, 45 P .3d at 820, citing Kolln v Sf. Luke's Reg 'I
Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d 1142 (1997).

The nine sentence affidavit of McIver being conclusory, it therefore does not satisfY either
the requirement of admissibility or competency under the rule, and being ineffective, it cannot
support the burden of a summary judgment.

C. Summary Judgment

.1

The burden on summary judgment never shifted to Plaintiffs, therefore summary judgment
should not have been granted in favor of Defendants
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Given Defendants' reliance on an insufficient affidavit, the burden on summary judgment
never shifted. As the Supreme Court stated in Pearson:
if a defendant seeks summary judgment in a medical malpractice case, the supporting
affidavits or other evidence must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56( c). Merely
filing a motion for summary judgment is not sufficient to place the burden on the
adverse party to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact. The motion
must be supported as provided in I.R.C.P. 56 in order to invoke the requirement that
"an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings,
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.c.P. 56(e).

Pearson, at 338, 757 P.2d at 201.
The affidavit of Ms. McIver is admissible, though ineffective; the burden never shifted and
as a result, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants and further
erred by not granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. This Court must reverse the District
Court's ruling.

2.

With an Ineffective Affidavit for Defendants and Admissible Expert Affidavits for the
Plaintiffs, the District Court Should have Granted Summary Judgment in Favor of Plaintiffs.
In 2011, the Supreme Court affirmed the principle that summary judgment may be awarded

in favor ofthe non-moving party (against the moving party). In Fuller v Dave Callister, 150 Idaho
848,252 P.3d 1255 (2011), the court quoted, with approval, Harwood v Talbert:
The district court may grant summary judgment to a non-moving party even if the
party has not filed its own motion with the court. A motion for summary judgment
allows the court to rule on the issues placed before it as a matter oflaw; the moving
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party runs the risk that the court will find against it...
In instances where summary judgment is granted to the non-moving party, this Court
liberally construes the record in favor of the party against whom the judgment was
entered. The party against whom the judgment will be entered must be given
adequate notice and opportunity to demonstrate why summary judgment should not
be entered. It is also true that a district court may not decide an issue not raised in
the moving party's motion for summary judgment.
[citations omitted.]
Fuller, at 851, 252 P.3d at 1269.
In the instant case, the Defendants were put on notice via Plaintiffs responsive brief (see:
R. Vol. II, pp. 402 - 413. Despite the notice, Defendants insisted on continuing to rely solely on the

nine (9) sentence affidavit of Carol McIver.
With the record before the district court consisting of the Defendants' solitary affidavit and
the total of four affidavits from Dr. Mackay and Nurse Thomason, who (as has been shown) met the
requirements to be expert witnesses before the Court, the Defendants were unable to demonstrate
a genuine issue of fact, while the Plaintiffs established facts of the breach of the standard of care and
proximate cause ofthe death of Ms. Mattox. With such a record, summary judgment should have
been granted in favor of Plaintiffs and against the Defendants.
This court must reverse the district court and grant summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs,
against Defendants, and then remand with instructions for a trial on the issue of damages only.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the affidavits of Wendy C. Thomason and Dr. Jayme Mackay
should not have been stricken and the District Court must be reversed. Further, summary judgment
should not have been granted in favor of Defendants, and again the District Court must be reversed.
Finally, with the status of the record as it exists, summary judgment should be granted in favor of
Plaintiffs, and this action be remanded with instructions for trial to establish damages.
Respectfully submitted
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